BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//archive.cryptologicfoundation.org//NONSGML kigkonsult.se iCalcrea
 tor 2.30.10//
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
UID:d319dd1b-eec1-41a5-bab4-9c43aef03d90
X-WR-CALDESC:28 July 1917: Capt Frank Moorman was tasked by AEF G2\, Brig. 
 Gen. Dennis Nolan to form a new Radio Intelligence Section with the missio
 n of reading German code and deciphering messages. Photo via the George C.
  Marshall Foundation. \n\n<b>Learn more via the article included below\, '
 Tactical Signals Intelligence Originates in World War I\,' by Ruth Quinn</
 b> \n\n'Tactical Signals Intelligence Originates in World War I July 1917'
 \nBy Ruth Quinn\, Staff Historian\nUSAICoE Command History Office\n\nOn Ju
 ly 28\, 1917\, the American Expeditionary Forces G2\, Brigadier General De
 nnis Nolan\, tasked Captain Frank Moorman\, a Coast Artillery officer\, to
  form a new Radio Intelligence Section under the General Staff. Moorman un
 derstood that the mission of the new Section was to read German code and d
 ecipher messages\, but that was where his guidance ended. He had to form t
 he section and begin work without the benefit of training\, an after actio
 n report or a standard operating procedure. How this intelligence was to b
 e collected and deciphered was still unknown. For almost two months\, Capt
 ain Moorman worked alone\, studying British and French methods\, and consu
 lting with the Signal Corps\, who also operated their own Radio Intelligen
 ce Section. He was eventually joined in September by First Lieutenant H.A.
  Berthold\, another Coastal Artillery officer\, and in October by Army Fie
 ld Clerk Harry Block.\n\nMoorman was able to gain access to an area in the
  vicinity of the Meuse River in order to set up a few intercept stations. 
 He needed to be able to collect raw traffic so he and his men could practi
 ce the decoding methods they had been learning from their allies. In addit
 ion\, he worked a deal with the Signal Corps to furnish men and instrument
 s to intercept messages and relay them to the new Section. The first messa
 ges were intercepted on October 29\, 1917 by the American station at Gondr
 ecourt\, but these were few in number\, since the station was so far from 
 the front. To frustrate the new section even more\, considerable time was 
 dedicated to decoding these first messages\, under the belief that they we
 re of German origin. In fact\, they were meaningless practice messages tra
 nsmitted by stations attached to the American School at Langres. The Radio
  Intelligence Section boys were off to a rocky start.\n\nIt wasn’t long\, 
 however\, before the efficiency of the personnel increased\, creating grea
 ter volume. On November 12\, 1917\, a station in Souilly opened with one s
 ergeant and eight men from the Second Field Signal Battalion. In the first
  month of continuous 24-hour operation\, the station recorded a total of 3
 93 messages and 1\,173 calls which were turned over to the RIS for trainin
 g purposes. From that point on\, it became standard for all new intercept 
 operators to first receive training at the schools at Langres and Gondreco
 urt and then be placed as close to the front line as practicable for their
  advanced training.\n\nThe two operators at the intercept station at Gener
 al Headquarters recorded and turned over to the RIS\, General Staff\, an a
 verage of 15 messages and seven press reports a day during the month of No
 vember 1917. From the date the first intercept was received\, messages cam
 e in so fast that the tiny staff of the RIS\, General Staff\, were unable 
 to handle them all\, and it soon became necessary to enlarge the section. 
 Officers and clerks were therefore obtained from all available sources. In
  the case of officers\, a search was made for men of high mental caliber w
 ho also knew German. This proved to be a challenge\, as Moorman wrote in h
 is final report\, “The difficulty experienced in finding men who could act
 ually think without a guardian was surprising. It is to be hoped that one 
 of the aims of the future will be to develop this ability in men chosen fo
 r code and cipher work.”\n\nBetween its start on July 28\, 1917\, and Lt. 
 Col. Moorman’s final report dated January 2\, 1919\, a total of eighty per
 sonnel were members of the General Staff Radio Intelligence Section at one
  time or another\, including Captain Herbert O. Yardley\, who later headed
  the Army’s code and cipher bureau and the State Department’s Black Chambe
 r\, and First Lieutenant William F. Friedman\, who would later head the Ar
 my’s Signal Intelligence Service.\n\nIn 1920\, Lt. Col. Moorman spoke abou
 t the difficulties of his task during the tumultuous build-up of the First
  World War to the officers of the Military Intelligence Division of the Ge
 neral Staff:\n“One is the difficulty in getting men who are trained in the
  work. General Nolan expressed the situation very well toward the latter p
 art of the war when he said that he started in with a misconception of wha
 t was required. He said that the next time he would put into this work the
  best brains of the country. He also admitted that he had not appreciated 
 the importance of the code and cipher work…Next\, we lacked liaison with W
 ashington. I do not think that Washington understood our problems in the b
 eginning. We did not understand Washington\, and did not make any particul
 ar effort to appeal to them for help.”\n\nThe men of the Radio Intelligenc
 e Service\, General Staff located enemy radio stations\, constructed net d
 iagrams\, intercepted and decoded enemy radio and telegraph messages and t
 elephone conversations\, intercepted and located radio signals from airpla
 nes ranging for hostile artillery\, policed American telephone lines near 
 the front operational security\, and distributed American trench codes. Mo
 orman and his section were in the forefront of the American Army’s first f
 oray into tactical signals intelligence.\n\nSource: SRH-001 Historical Bac
 kground of the Signal Security Agency\, Volume II\, World War I\, prepared
  under the direction of the Assistant Chief of Staff\, G-2\, 12 April 1946
 \, in USAICoE archives.
X-WR-RELCALID:94f257f291ee73d6dde41b023df2cc2f
X-WR-TIMEZONE:America/New_York
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:America/New_York
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZNAME:EST
DTSTART:20251102T020000
TZOFFSETFROM:-0400
TZOFFSETTO:-0500
RDATE:20261101T020000
RDATE:20271107T020000
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZNAME:EDT
DTSTART:20260308T020000
TZOFFSETFROM:-0500
TZOFFSETTO:-0400
RDATE:20270314T020000
END:DAYLIGHT
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:0a35bb7e-9c54-4143-b1d4-61b5ba65ca75
DTSTAMP:20260424T093338Z
DESCRIPTION:28 July 1917: Capt Frank Moorman was tasked by AEF G2\, Brig. G
 en. Dennis Nolan to form a new Radio Intelligence Section with the mission
  of reading German code and deciphering messages. Photo via the George C. 
 Marshall Foundation. \n\n<b>Learn more via the article included below\, 'T
 actical Signals Intelligence Originates in World War I\,' by Ruth Quinn</b
 > \n\n'Tactical Signals Intelligence Originates in World War I July 1917'
 \nBy Ruth Quinn\, Staff Historian\nUSAICoE Command History Office\n\nOn Ju
 ly 28\, 1917\, the American Expeditionary Forces G2\, Brigadier General De
 nnis Nolan\, tasked Captain Frank Moorman\, a Coast Artillery officer\, to
  form a new Radio Intelligence Section under the General Staff. Moorman un
 derstood that the mission of the new Section was to read German code and d
 ecipher messages\, but that was where his guidance ended. He had to form t
 he section and begin work without the benefit of training\, an after actio
 n report or a standard operating procedure. How this intelligence was to b
 e collected and deciphered was still unknown. For almost two months\, Capt
 ain Moorman worked alone\, studying British and French methods\, and consu
 lting with the Signal Corps\, who also operated their own Radio Intelligen
 ce Section. He was eventually joined in September by First Lieutenant H.A.
  Berthold\, another Coastal Artillery officer\, and in October by Army Fie
 ld Clerk Harry Block.\n\nMoorman was able to gain access to an area in the
  vicinity of the Meuse River in order to set up a few intercept stations. 
 He needed to be able to collect raw traffic so he and his men could practi
 ce the decoding methods they had been learning from their allies. In addit
 ion\, he worked a deal with the Signal Corps to furnish men and instrument
 s to intercept messages and relay them to the new Section. The first messa
 ges were intercepted on October 29\, 1917 by the American station at Gondr
 ecourt\, but these were few in number\, since the station was so far from 
 the front. To frustrate the new section even more\, considerable time was 
 dedicated to decoding these first messages\, under the belief that they we
 re of German origin. In fact\, they were meaningless practice messages tra
 nsmitted by stations attached to the American School at Langres. The Radio
  Intelligence Section boys were off to a rocky start.\n\nIt wasn’t long\, 
 however\, before the efficiency of the personnel increased\, creating grea
 ter volume. On November 12\, 1917\, a station in Souilly opened with one s
 ergeant and eight men from the Second Field Signal Battalion. In the first
  month of continuous 24-hour operation\, the station recorded a total of 3
 93 messages and 1\,173 calls which were turned over to the RIS for trainin
 g purposes. From that point on\, it became standard for all new intercept 
 operators to first receive training at the schools at Langres and Gondreco
 urt and then be placed as close to the front line as practicable for their
  advanced training.\n\nThe two operators at the intercept station at Gener
 al Headquarters recorded and turned over to the RIS\, General Staff\, an a
 verage of 15 messages and seven press reports a day during the month of No
 vember 1917. From the date the first intercept was received\, messages cam
 e in so fast that the tiny staff of the RIS\, General Staff\, were unable 
 to handle them all\, and it soon became necessary to enlarge the section. 
 Officers and clerks were therefore obtained from all available sources. In
  the case of officers\, a search was made for men of high mental caliber w
 ho also knew German. This proved to be a challenge\, as Moorman wrote in h
 is final report\, “The difficulty experienced in finding men who could act
 ually think without a guardian was surprising. It is to be hoped that one 
 of the aims of the future will be to develop this ability in men chosen fo
 r code and cipher work.”\n\nBetween its start on July 28\, 1917\, and Lt. 
 Col. Moorman’s final report dated January 2\, 1919\, a total of eighty per
 sonnel were members of the General Staff Radio Intelligence Section at one
  time or another\, including Captain Herbert O. Yardley\, who later headed
  the Army’s code and cipher bureau and the State Department’s Black Chambe
 r\, and First Lieutenant William F. Friedman\, who would later head the Ar
 my’s Signal Intelligence Service.\n\nIn 1920\, Lt. Col. Moorman spoke abou
 t the difficulties of his task during the tumultuous build-up of the First
  World War to the officers of the Military Intelligence Division of the Ge
 neral Staff:\n“One is the difficulty in getting men who are trained in the
  work. General Nolan expressed the situation very well toward the latter p
 art of the war when he said that he started in with a misconception of wha
 t was required. He said that the next time he would put into this work the
  best brains of the country. He also admitted that he had not appreciated 
 the importance of the code and cipher work…Next\, we lacked liaison with W
 ashington. I do not think that Washington understood our problems in the b
 eginning. We did not understand Washington\, and did not make any particul
 ar effort to appeal to them for help.”\n\nThe men of the Radio Intelligenc
 e Service\, General Staff located enemy radio stations\, constructed net d
 iagrams\, intercepted and decoded enemy radio and telegraph messages and t
 elephone conversations\, intercepted and located radio signals from airpla
 nes ranging for hostile artillery\, policed American telephone lines near 
 the front operational security\, and distributed American trench codes. Mo
 orman and his section were in the forefront of the American Army’s first f
 oray into tactical signals intelligence.\n\nSource: SRH-001 Historical Bac
 kground of the Signal Security Agency\, Volume II\, World War I\, prepared
  under the direction of the Assistant Chief of Staff\, G-2\, 12 April 1946
 \, in USAICoE archives.
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20260728T000000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20260728T235900
LOCATION:
SUMMARY:1917: Capt Frank Moorman tasked to form Radio Intelligence Section.
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR